In this paper, we design robust beamforming to guarantee the physical layer security for a multiuser beam division multiple access (BDMA) massive multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) system, when the channel estimation errors are taken into consideration. With the aid of artificial noise, the proposed design are formulated as minimizing the transmit power of the base station, while providing legal users and the eavesdropper with different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio. It is strictly proved that, under BDMA massive MIMO scheme, the initial non-convex optimization can be equivalently converted to a convex semi-definite programming problem and the optimal rank-one beamforming solutions can be guaranteed. In stead of directly resorting to the convex tool, we make one step further by deriving the optimal beamforming direction and the optimal beamforming power allocation in closed-form, which greatly reduces the computational complexity and makes the proposed design practical for real world applications. Simulation results are then provided to verify the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ASSIVE multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [1] is one of the key technologies for 5G wireless communications [2] , [3] , which utilizes a very large number of antennas at the base station (BS) to provide low power consumption, high spectral efficiency, security, and reliable linkage. It was shown in [4] that the propagation channel vectors of different users become asymptotically orthogonal, where the effects of uncorrelated noise and intra-cell interference will be eliminated when the number of antennas at the BS grows to infinity. As a result, simple linear signal processing approaches, i.e., matched filter (MF) and zero-forcing beamforming can be used in massive MIMO systems [5] . However, a prerequisite of enjoying above benefits is the availability of channel state information (CSI). There are three main approaches of low-complex channel estimation algorithms that referred to different expansion basis to represent the sparsity inside channels [6] - [12] . For example, Yin et al. [6] and Adhikary et al. [7] applied a low-rank approximation of the channel covariance matrix to reduce the effective channel parameters of massive MIMO. The authors in [8] - [10] proposed an angle division multiple access (ADMA) model and the massive MIMO channels could be represented by a few channel gain and angular parameters. Moreover, [11] , [12] designed a beam division multiple access (BDMA) scheme and a few orthogonal basis from discrete Fourier transform (DFT) are used to approximate the channel vectors. Nevertheless, perfect CSI are not available in practice due to: (i) all [6] - [12] are based on approximately-sparse model and there must be residue errors; (ii) additive noise always exist at the receiver. Therefore, the channel estimation errors should be taken into consideration in the subsequent transmission design.
On the other side, secrecy and privacy are also critical concerns for 5G communication systems, where the physical layer security has drawn considerable interest since it can prevent eavesdropping without upper layer data encryption. The information-theoretic approach to guarantee secrecy was initiated by Wyner [13] , where it was shown that confidential messages transmission could be achieved by exploiting the physical characteristics of the wireless channel. Then the results of [13] was generalized to different channel models, i.e., the broadcast channels [14] , [15] , the single-input single-output (SISO) fading channels [16] , the multiple-input single-output (MISO) channels [17] - [19] , the cooperative communication channels [20] - [22] , and the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels [23] . Zhu et al. [24] first investigated the limiting physical layer security performance when the number of antennas approaches infinity in massive MIMO systems, and then [25] , [26] studied the physical layer security in massive MIMO relay channel and massive MIMO Rician Channel, respectively. The authors of [27] - [29] considered the asymptotic achievable secrecy rate in massive MIMO systems, where it was shown that under certain orthogonality conditions, the secrecy rate loss introduced by the eavesdropper could be completely mitigated. However, all [24] - [29] do not take channel estimation errors into consideration. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the optimal solution of robust beamforming for the physical layer security of massive MIMO systems has not been reported yet.
In this paper, we consider robust beamforming for the physical layer security of multiuser massive MIMO systems following BMDA scheme [11] , [12] , where the estimated channels are lied orthogonally to each other and the channel estimation errors are bounded by ball constants. The proposed design utilizes simultaneous robust information and artificial noise (AN) beamforming to provide the legal users and Eve with different signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR), meanwhile minimizing the transmit power of BS. The resulted problem is a well-known NP-hard [30] optimization, where the computational complexity [31] increases exponentially with the number of antennas. Consequently, existing robust beamforming algorithms for conventional communication systems [32] - [35] cannot be applied in massive MIMO systems due to their forbiddingly huge computational complexity. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that under the BDMA massive MIMO scheme, the proposed design can be globally solved. More importantly, the optimal robust beamforming vectors can be derived in closed-form, which will greatly reduce the computational complexity and is suitable for practical applications. Interestingly, it is shown that the AN beamforming is not necessary for the proposed robust optimization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the BDMA massive MIMO channel model and formulates the proposed robust design; Section III converts the initial non-convex optimization into a convex semi-definite programming (SDP) and proves the optimality of semidefinite relaxation (SDR); Closed-form solutions for the power allocation problem are derived in Section IV; Simulation results are provided in Section V and conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are boldface small and capital letters, respectively; The Hermitian, inverse and Moore-Penrose inverse of A are denoted by A H , A −1 and A † respectively; Tr(A) defines the trace; I and 0 represent an identity matrix and an all-zero matrix, respectively, with appropriate dimensions; A 0 and A 0 mean that A is positive semi-definite and positive definite, respectively; The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random variable with zero mean and variance σ 2 is defined as CN (0, σ 2 ), and ∼ means "distributed as"; R a×b and C a×b denote the spaces of a × b matrices with real-and complexvalued entries, respectively; x is the Euclidean norm of a vector x. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
Let us consider physical layer security for a multiuser massive MIMO system shown in Fig. 1 . It is assumed that the BS is equipped with N 1 antennas in the form of uniform linear array (ULA), where the antenna spacing is less than or equal to half wavelength. There are K legal users with index set K = {1, . . . , K} and one Eve randomly distributed in the coverage area, where all the legal users and the Eve are quipped with single antenna. The channel from the kth user to BS can be expressed as [6] and [10] 
where Θ k is the incoming angular spread of user-k and α k (θ) is the corresponding spatial power spectrum. Moreover, a(θ) ∈ C N ×1 is the steering vector that can be expressed as a(θ) = 1, e j 2πd λ sin θ , . . . , e j 2πd λ (N −1) sin θ H , where d is the antenna spacing and λ denotes the signal wavelength. Similarly, the channel from the Eve to BS can be expressed as h e = θ∈Θe α e (θ)a(θ)dθ, where Θ e is the incoming angular spread of Eve and α e (θ) is the corresponding spatial power spectrum.
In this paper, we adopt the recently popular low complexity BDMA channel estimation scheme [11] , [12] such that pilots of different users are transmitted through orthogonal spatial directions, and the estimated channels for different users must be orthogonal, i.e.,
Please refer to [11] and [12] for detailed discussion of BDMA. We then assume that the real channel vectors h k and h e lie around the estimated channel vectorsh k andh e , respectively, i.e.,
where δ k ∈ C N ×1 and δ e ∈ C N ×1 are the channel estimation errors whose norms are assumed to be bounded by k and e respectively. 1
B. Problem Formulation
Let us apply AN at BS during the downlink data transmission to provide the strongest distortion to Eve, i.e., the baseband signal from BS can be expressed as
where v k ∼ CN(0, 1) denotes the data symbol for the kth user; v w ∼ CN (0, 1) is the AN signal for the Eve; s k ∈ C N ×1 and w ∈ C N ×1 are information beamforming vector and AN beamforming vector, respectively. The downlink signal at the kth user can be expressed as
where n k ∼ CN(0, σ 2 k ) represents the antenna noise of the kth user. The downlink signal at the Eve can be expressed as
where n e ∼ CN(0, σ 2 e ) represents the antenna noise of the Eve. Then the secret rate for the kth user are expressed as
where γ k is the receive SINR for the kth user, and γ e,k is the receive SINR for Eve when Eve aims to eavesdrop the kth user. Note that when γ k > γ e,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, we could always obtain non-zero secret rate for each users, which implies that the physical layer security could be strictly guaranteed.
Our target is to design simultaneous information beamforming vectors {s k } and AN beamforming vector w e to provide legal users and the Eve with different SINRs, meanwhile minimizing the transmit power of BS. Taking the channel estimation errors into consideration, the robust transmit beamforming design can be formulated as 2 P1 : min
where γ e,k > 0 is the maximum allowable SINR for Eve, and γ k > 0 is the desired SINR for the kth user. Note that the optimal solutions of P1 are very hard to obtain in conventional MIMO systems. 3 Nevertheless, we will next show that P1 could be globally solved utilizing property (1) of BDMA massive MIMO systems.
III. OPTIMAL ROBUST BEAMFORMING A. Problem Reformulation
The main difficulty of solving P1 lies in the constraints (8) and (9) . Define X e,k and X s,k as
respectively. Substituting (2) into (8), we can equivalently rewrite (8) as
Substituting (2) into (9), we can equivalently rewrite (9) as
According to the Lemma of S-Procedure [39] , we know that the constraints in (13) Meanwhile, the constraints in (14) hold true if and only if there exists μ s,k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , K such that
It is then clear that P1 can be equivalently re-expressed as
where {μ e,k } and {μ s,k } are the auxiliary variables generated by the S-Procedure. Note that the nonlinear constraints in (23) are equivalent to:
However, P1−EQV is still very hard to solve since the rank constraint in (23) is non-convex. Dropping the the rank constraints Rank(W e ) = 1 and Rank(S k ) = 1 (the SDR technique [40] ), we can obtain the following relaxed convex optimization:
which is a semi-definite programming (SDP) problem that can be efficiently solved by the standard convex optimization tools [30] . However, the SDR technique does not guarantee rank-one solutions for the relaxed optimization. Nevertheless, we will next show that P1−SDR indeed guarantees rank-one solutions for BDMA massive MIMO systems, i.e., P1−SDR is equivalent to P1−EQV.
B. Optimal Rank-One Solutions
The following propositions will be useful throughout the rest of the paper. 
Proof: See Appendix B. Remark 1: Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 indicate that the optimal AN and information transmit covariance could not be full-rank, i.e., Rank (W e ) < N and 
Define Σ e,k,+ and Σ s,k,+ as
respectively. The Moore-Penrose inverses [41] of X e,k +μ e,k I and X s,k + μ s,k I can be derived as 4
respectively. Then we provide the following lemma. Using Lemma 2, we know that P1−SDR could be equivalently rewritten as P1−SDR−EQV :
where the constraints in (31)∼(35) are derived from (18) and (19) . Next, we will investigate the constraints (31)∼ (35) to obtain more insightful solutions. Eq. (32) can be expressed as
Similarly, Eq. (34) can be expressed as
2 is the optimal AN transmit covariance that can be derived through the closed-form AN beamforming vector, and P e is the power allocated for the AN beamforming;
is the optimal information transmit covariance that can be derived through the closed-form information beamforming vectors, and P k is the power allocated for the kth information beamforming. Proof: See Appendix C. Remark 2: Theorem 1 indicates that simultaneous AN-and information-beamforming is the optimal transmit strategy for P1−SDR−EQV rather than the joint precoding scheme. Thus, the SDR solutions are indeed optimal for P1. However, the optimal power allocations P e and {P k } remain unknown. Nevertheless, we could further investigate P1 to derive the optimal power allocations.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
In Section III, it is shown that the optimal solutions of P1 could be derived by solving P1−SDR−EQV, where the optimal beamforming vectors are derived in closed-form. Since the optimal AN-beamforming and information-beamforming vectors are w e = P ehe / h e and s k = P kh k / h k , P1 can be simplified to 
Define
whose Hessian matrixes are given by
,
respectively, which implies that f e,k (μ e,k , P e ) and f s,k (μ s,k , P k ) are concave functions. Thus, P2 is a convex optimization.
A. Optimal AN Power Allocation
The optimal AN power allocation P e can be summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: At the optimal point, the AN power allocation P e of P2 must satisfy P e = 0, where the corresponding auxiliary variables {μ e,k } satisfy μ e,k = σ 2 e / 2 e > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.
Proof: Let us show that P e = 0 from contradiction. Assume {μ e,k }, {μ s,k }, P e and {P k } are the optimal solutions of P2, where P e > 0 is satisfied. Then we can provide a group of new solutions:
Substituting (45) into P2, we obtain k = 1, . . . , K
μ * e,k > 0, μ * s,k > 0, P * e = 0, P * k ≥ 0. } are the optimal solutions. Thus, at the optimal point there must be P e = 0.
Theorem 2 says that in order to optimally guarantee the the physical layer security for BDMA massive MIMO system, one should not adopt the AN beamforming, which is much different from the conventional MIMO case.
B. Optimal Information Power Allocation
The Lagrange of P2 is defined as
where { k ≥ 0} and {ξ k ≥ 0} are the dual variables associated with the constraints (42) 
where {μ e,k > 0}, {μ s,k > 0}, P e ≥ 0 and {P k ≥ 0} are the optimal primal variables, { k ≥ 0} and {ξ k ≥ 0} are the optimal dual variables. Due to {μ s,k > 0} and {P k ≥ 0}, it follows from (54) that {ξ k > 0} must be satisfied. Then we know from (56) that
and from (52) that
Next, substituting (58) into (54), there holds
Lastly, substituting (58) and (59) into (57), we have
From the above discussions, we know that the optimal solutions of the proposed design P1 could be derived in closed-form, which will significantly reduce the computational complexity for massive MIMO systems where the number of antennas is huge. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, computer simulations are presented to evaluate the performance of the proposed SINR-based robust beamforming algorithm for the physical layer security of BDMA massive MIMO systems. It is assumed that all the legal users and the Eve are equipped with single antenna, where the received noises per antenna for all users are generated as independent CSCG random variables distributed with CN (0, 1). For simplicity, the required SINR for all users are assumed to be the same, i.e., γ = γ 1 , . . . , = γ K and γ e = γ e,1 , . . . , = γ e,K . Define g = k / h k = e / h e with g ∈ [0, 1). The simulation results are averaged over 10000 Monte Carlo runs.
In the first example, we plot the average SINR of Eve versus the parameter g with K = 30, N = 128 and γ = 10 dB for the proposed method, the AN = 0 method 5 and the nonrobust method 6 in Fig. 2 . Note that the theoretical results in Section IV say that the optimal power allocation for AN beamforming should be zero, which implies that the received SINR of Eve is smaller than γ e (please cf. Eq. (8) for details) without using AN. These theoretical results can be reflected in Fig. 2 where it is clear that the average SINRs of Eve obtained by the proposed method, the AN = 0 method and the non-robust method are smaller than 0 dB when g ≤ 0.7. This phenomenon implies that the constraint in (8) will be strictly satisfied when we set γ e > 0 dB. Based on the results of Fig. 2 , we could always choose a small γ e , i.e., 0 < γ e < 1 to guarantee that (8) is strictly satisfied for the proposed robust design. Moreover, it is obvious in Fig. 2 that the average SINRs of Eve derived by the three methods will increase with the increase of g. This is mainly due to the fact that when g becomes large, i.e., the channel estimation errors grow large, more power will be received at Eve. Nevertheless, we can 5 In this method we assume that the AN beamforming power is set as 0.3 È K k=1 P k and the information beamforming power is set as 0.7P k for each legal user. Thus, the power consumption of the AN = 0 method is exactly the same as that of the proposed method. 6 Note that for the non-robust method, the estimated channels will be directly assumed as perfect and are used for beamforming. Thus, the optimal beamforming solutions of P1 for the non-robust method can be easily derived as we = 0 and s k = γ k σ 2 k / h k . The details are omitted here for brevity. Fig. 3 . Secret sum-rate versus the parameter g with K = 30, N = 128 and γ = 10 dB. assume that g is a small constant which is reasonable since large channel estimate errors usually lead to unacceptable degradation in performance. It is seen from Fig. 2 that the average SINR of Eve derived by the proposed method is always bigger than that of the AN = 0 method and the nonrobust method. This phenomenon can be explained by the following simulation results, i.e., the proposed method will obtain a higher secret sum-rate.
In the second example, we plot the secret sum-rate versus parameter g, N and K, in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 , respectively. Note that the secret sum-rate derived by the proposed method is always bigger than that of the AN = 0 method. Thus, in order to optimally guarantee the the physical layer security for BDMA massive MIMO system, one should not adopt the AN beamforming. Moreover, it is clear in Fig. 3 that the secret sum-rate for the non-robust method will decrease with parameter g increasing. This is mainly due to the fact that the non-robust method does not take the channel estimation errors into consideration. Thus, with g increasing, more power will be received at Eve and the secret sum-rate performance will be deteriorated. Interestingly, the secret sum-rate for the proposed method will increase with the increase of g when g ≤ 0.3. The reason lies in that when g increases, BS will allocate more power for information beamforming (please cf. Eq. (60) for details). While the secret sum-rate for the proposed method will decrease with the increase of g when g > 0.3. This phenomenon can be explained by Fig. 2 where it says that the average SINR of Eve will also increase with the increase of g. Thus, the secret sum-rate for the proposed method will decrease when the increase of SINR of legal users is smaller than that of the Eve. Similarly, it is seen from Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 that the secret sum-rates for the proposed method, the AN = 0 method and the non-robust method will increase with the increase of N and K.
In the last example, we plot the average minimum transmit power versus the parameter g, N and K in Fig. 6, Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 , respectively. Note that the power consumption of the AN = 0 method is exactly the same as that of the proposed method. Thus, the simulation results of the AN = 0 method are not contained in the last example. It is seen from Fig. 6 that the transmit power for the non-robust method will not change with parameter g. While the transmit power for the proposed method will increase when g becomes large. This is because when the channel estimation errors becomes large, the BS will allocate more power to eliminate the CSI uncertainty. As a result, the proposed method can obtain a higher secret sumrate than the non-robust method as in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 . Moreover, it is clear in Fig. 7 that the transmit power for both the proposed method and the non-robust method will increase with K increasing, and in Fig. 8 that the transmit power for both the proposed method and the non-robust method will decrease with the increase of N .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we design simultaneous information and AN beamforming to guarantee the physical layer security for multiuser BDMA massive MIMO systems. Taking the the channel estimation errors into consideration, our target is to minimize the transmit power of BS meanwhile provide the legal users and the Eve with different SINRs. The original nonconvex problem cannot be solved efficiently for large values of N and is thus not suited for real-time signal processing applications. Nevertheless, we strictly proved that it can be equivalently reformulated as an SDP, where rank-one solutions are guaranteed in BDMA multiuser massive MIMO systems. More importantly, the overall global optimal solutions for the original problem are derived in closed-form, which will greatly reduce the computational complexity. An interesting phenomenon is that the AN is not useful for multi-user BDMA massive scenario. Simulation results are provided to corroborate the proposed studies.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
A. Proof of Part (a)
Let us first show that {μ e,k > 0} must hold from contradiction. Assuming μ e,k = 0 for some k that k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it follows from (20) 
must be satisfied. Moreover, from (20) and (21), we can obtain
where the last " " holds true due to the fact that X e,k 0, S k 0 and γ e,k < γ k . Next, we know from (19) that
should be strictly satisfied. However, substituting (A.3) into (A.4), we will obtain
Due to the fact that σ 2 k > 0, we know from (A.5) can not be true. Thus, at the optimal point, μ e,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} must be satisfied in P1−SDR.
B. Proof of Part (b)
Then, let us show that {μ s,k > 0} must hold from contradiction. Assuming μ s,k = 0 for some k that k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, it follows from (21) 
which cannot be true due to σ 2 k > 0. Thus, at the optimal point, μ s,k > 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} must be satisfied in P1−SDR.
The proof is thus completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 A. Proof of Part (a)
Let us show Rank X e,k + μ e,k I ≥ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} from contradiction. Assume Rank X e,k + μ e,k I = 0 or X e,k + μ e,k I = 0 at the optimal point, for some k that ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. It is known from (20) that X e,k + μ e,k I can be re-expressed as X e,k +μ e,k I = μ e,k I + i =k 
1} is a unit vector, i.e., τ i = 1 which is constrained to satisfy the following properties:
. . , K}. Note that when K + 1 (the number of users) is equal to N (the number of antennas of BS), there holds τ i = 0 and the properties of (B.3) are still satisfied. For simplicity, we assume N > K + 1 in the paper. Thanks to (1) under BDMA massive MIMO scheme, we know that the defined matrix Q is consisted of N orthogonal bases. Thus, Q is invertible, i.e., Q −1 exists. Consequently, there must be Due to the fact that Q is consisted of N orthogonal bases, by carefully using the Generalized Schur's Complement, it can be proved that W e and S k , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , K} can be further expressed by Q, i.e., 
Then substituting (B.7) into (19) , it is easily known that and Eq. (C.5) for details). From (C.3) and (C.12), we obtain
which implies that W * e and {S * k } will not violate the constraints in (34) of P1−SDR−EQV (please cf. Eq. (C.6) and Eq. (C.7) for details). Moreover, it is easily known from (C.2), (C.3), (C.11) and (C.12) that if μ s,k − P we,he + K i=1 P si,he ≥ 0, there must hold X * e,k +μ e,k I 0 and X * s,k + μ s,k I 0. Interestingly, it is observed from (C.8) that we can always let q e,k,1 = P we,he + K i=1 P si,he = 0 and μ e,k = σ 2 e / 2 e , which will not violate (C.8). A more rigorous proof can be found in Theorem 2.
As a result, substituting W * e and {S * k } into P1−SDR−EQV, we obtain from (30) where P we and P s k are the optimal power allocation for AN beamforming and information beamforming, respectively. The proof of Theorem 1 is thus completed.
